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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Saturday, 22 October 1977.

The NID Cable is for the purpose of informing senior US officials.

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> Cuba-Angola South Africa

SOMALIA-USSR: Situation Report

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Somali President Siad yesterday made his most serious public criticism to date of Soviet support for Ethiopia in the hostilities with Somalia. Siad is probably trying to get the Soviets to back down from their strong commitment to Ethiopia,

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and he does not appear ready to break with Moscow completely. The Soviet Ambassador to Ethiopia added to the controversy on Tuesday by making the most unequivocal public statement to date of Soviet support for Ethiopia.

Siad said that the Soviet arms build-up in Ethiopia jeopardized relations between Somalia and the USSR. He warned that it was "extremely dangerous" for the international community to watch silently the development of the Ethiopian-Somali war into an international crisis, and he appealed to other countries to urge the USSR to cut off its supply of arms to Ethiopia. He said Cuba, which has sent military advisers to Ethiopia, was also playing a dangerous role in the Horn of Africa.

The Somali President probably still hopes the Soviets can be persuaded to return to a more even-handed policy toward the Ethiopians and the Somalis. He is probably implicitly warning the Soviets that he has the option of denying them access to their important naval and communications facilities in Somalia.

He also hopes to arouse international pressure against the USSR by depicting its delivery of arms to Ethiopia as the main cause of continued fighting in the Ogaden. He probably wants to see if these tactics get results before deciding on any specific action against the Soviet presence in Somalia.

Siad's choices are limited. Somali forces can continue fighting for some time, but Siad has been unable to find a country willing to supply Somalia with the heavy military equipment which the Soviets are refusing to provide. Ethiopia, if it continues to receive Soviet weapons, seems likely eventually to regain the military initiative, although it will probably be several months before the Ethiopians can launch an effective counterattack.

The Soviet Ambassador to Ethiopia stated in a press conference in Addis Ababa that the USSR supports Ethiopia in its struggle to preserve its territorial integrity and claimed that the Soviets had stopped arms deliveries to Somalia.

His remarks appear mainly intended for Ethiopian consumption. Both he and the Soviet Ambassador to Somalia have previously told US Embassy officials in Addis Ababa and Mogadiscio that the Soviets are no longer supplying Somalia with major military equipment.

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25X1 25X1,	We have no evidence, however, that the Soviets have indeed cut off all arms to Somalia. Moscow is apparently continuing to supply the Somalis with previously contracted spare parts and some ammunition but will probably not conclude any new arms agreements with them as long as fighting continues in the Ogaden. the Soviets did threaten to cut off arms to Somalia when, during his visit to Moscow in late August, Somali President Siad refused to withdraw from the Ogaden.	
25X1	In his remarks, the Soviet Ambassador to Ethiopia said the USSR "firmly supports the people of Ethiopia in their struggle for territorial integrity and the preservation of revolutionary achievements." Since mid-August, the Soviets have supported the concept of territorial integrity as the basis for a settlement.	
25X1	On Tuesday, the Ambassador made no mention of a negotiated settlementa standard feature of Soviet statements on the Horn in the past. This omission may be due to his recognition of Ethiopia's resistance to any peace talks as long as Somalia occupies most of the Ogaden, but it may also be an indication of a growing Soviet belief in the futility of further mediation attempts.	25X1
	CHINA: Anti-Soviet Efforts	
25X1	Chinese Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping's explicit call yesterday for the US to join in an international effort to oppose the Soviets does not appear to mark a shift in China's foreign policy position. In an interview with the president of a French news agency, Teng expressed hope that an effort to oppose Moscow "will be made by the third world, the second world, and even including the first world, the United States."	
25X1 ∕	This may be the first time a Chinese leader has used this particular formulation in public, but Peking for some time has warned the US and Western Europe of the dangers of "appeasing" the Soviets and has called for a "broad united front" to oppose Moscow, one that would implicitly include the US. Three weeks ago, Teng told a visiting group of West German political and military figures of China's hope to encourage the formation of an anti-Soviet "alliance" comprising the US. Japan, Western Europe, and China.	

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25X1	In a departure from Peking's usual public reticence on the subject, Teng was openly critical of the "Eurocommunist" parties. He appeared skeptical about the independence of those parties from Moscow. Although he played down the ability of the Eurocommunists to damage West European security, Teng emphatically opposed participation in government by the Communist parties of Spain, France, and Italy, arguing that such a development would accentuate a policy of appeasement toward the USSR.	• 25X1
	POLAND: Students	
25X1	//Increased political activity on Polish campuses seems to have officials worried. Party leader Gierek will reportedly make several conciliatory speeches to students in an attempt to keep them calm.//	
25X1	A resident of Poznan has told a US Embassy officer that police entered the campus of the Poznan Polytechnic School on 17 October to stop members of a dissident organization from passing out literature to students. Police forces were subsequently assembled in large numbers in other parts of the city, evidently reflecting official uncertainty about students' reaction to the police move on campus.	
25X1	The regime has been particularly concerned about tensions on the country's campuses since the June 1976 worker riots. A student campaign in May pushing for an investigation of the suspicious death of a student human rights activist in Krakow was a strong reminder of the trouble students can cause. Officials are also concerned about the efforts of dissident intellectuals to organize students in the pursuit of human rights.	
25X1	//Earlier this month, regime officials were particularly worried about widespread student efforts to expand the committees formed to support the	25X1
	workers into organizations devoted to exposing "widespread abuses and illegalities in Poland." Dissidents have openly	
	said they are encouraging these efforts.//	25X1

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WEST GERMANY: Terrorist Funerals

//The funerals for the three West German terrorists who died in prison this week after fellow terrorists were killed by West German commandos in Somalia will take place in Stuttgart on Monday. A state funeral for murdered industrialist Hans-Martin Schleyer will take place the next day, also in Stuttgart. Despite efforts to keep the details of the funerals secret, they are bound to attract large groups of mourners whose philosophies are diametrically opposed, and some clashes may occur.//

//West German press sources have quoted "reliable legal quarters" to the effect that the autopsy reports to be released next week "clearly establish that the three killed themselves." The question of how the prisoners were able to obtain weapons and other equipment while inside West Germany's "most secure" prison has already caused the dismissal of three Baden-Wuerttemberg state penal officials, including the state Justice Minister.//

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	//In addition, the extreme embarrassment to the state Christian Democratic Union administration probably caused its state parliamentary representatives to abstain on the issue of forming a separate investigating committee to probe into the lax security conditions at the prison. The Christian Democratic Union is in the unenviable position of having criticized the coalition government of Chancellor Helmut Schmidt earlier for "coddling" terrorists and now having to explain what happened under its own state government.	• 1 25X
	SUDAN: Implications of Sadiq Al-Mahdi's Return	
25X1	The return to Sudan last month of Sadiq al-Mahdi, leader of the exiled Ansar dissidents, was a milestone in Sudanese President Numayri's effort to reach a reconciliation with conservative opposition groups, notably the Ansar Islamic sect and the Muslim Brotherhood. The rehabilitation of Sadiq, who claims the allegiance of some 6,000 exiled Sudanese dissidents in Ethiopia and 2,000 in Libya, could, together with recent diplomatic overtures, largely neutralize the efforts of the Ethiopian and Libyan governments to use the Ansar to undermine the Numayri government.	
25X1	Numayri hopes to integrate former Sudanese dissidents into domestic political life without jeopardizing his existing power base, especially within the army. The reconciliation process has set in motion new political forces, however, that will be difficult to control. Much will depend on how effectively Numayri restrains Sadiq and other opposition leaders and controls the inevitable political infighting between them and their domestic opponents.	
25X1	//Aware that some of his key advisers distrust Sadiq, Numayri will probably move cautiously in rehabilitating the Ansar leader.	25X ,
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25X1 25X1 A dramatic turnaround in Sudanese-Libyan relations is unlikely, but Numayri probably hopes the Libyans will at least allow Ansar dissidents to follow Sadiq home. He is also aware that Egypt has, at least temporarily, decided to paper over its differences with Libya and presumably desires to follow suit. The demarche to Libya may also be related to Numayri's 25X1 recent conciliatory gesture to Ethiopia, entailing a renewed offer to mediate between the Eritrean guerrillas and the military regime in Addis Ababa. In both cases, Numayri may hope that his overtures will not only facilitate the return of Ansar dissidents but also serve to weaken Soviet influence in Africa, another key Sudanese objective. 25X1 BRIEFS 25X1 Israel 25X1 The leader of Israel's Democratic Movement for Change, Yigael Yadin, is encountering unexpectedly strong resistance within his own party to joining the government. Party leaders opposing the move marshalled 45 votes against 68 votes for

	joining the cabinet in the party council meeting Thursday night. They threatened yesterday to break ranks and will decide within the next few days whether to vote against the government in the Knesset.	•
25X1	The dissidentsled by Amnon Rubinstein, who favors a much more dovish approach to peace negotiations than does Prime Minister Beginare unlikely to deter Yadin from joining the cabinet, but they could deprive the party of possibly three of its 15 parliamentary seats.	•
25X1	Despite Yadin's designation as deputy prime minister, a spokesman for Likudthe dominant member of the governing coalitioninsisted yesterday that his party reserved the right to determine who would serve as prime minister in Begin's absence. Thus, there is some potential for a serious misunder-standing between the Democratic Movement and Likud over this matter unless it is quickly clarified.	25X
:	Ecuador	
25X1	The Ecuadorean security forces' violent suppression of a strike at a government-run sugar mill on Tuesday has resulted in the deaths of at least 24 workers. It was Ecuador's worst government-labor clash in recent memory. An official investigation of the incident has been shrouded in secrecy, but the unions say the death toll is much higher.	
25X1	For the moment, union leaders still appear to be in a state of shock. Should the government attempt to blame labor radicals for the bloodshed or otherwise fail to assume responsibility, as now seems likely, a general strike or other major protest demonstration in sympathy for the dead workers appears likely.	
25X1	Union chiefs, still smarting from tough government suppression of teachers' strikes last year, could also call for the removal of both the Government Minister, who is in charge of the police, and the Labor Minister.	25X
	Cuba-Angola	
25X1	An estimated 1,000 Cuban civilians are scheduled to arrive in Angola on a Soviet passenger ship this month. according to a foreign press report from Havana.	25X

25X1 An additional 1,000 Cuban civilian advisers would raise the total of such advisers in Angola to between 5,000 and 6,000 unless they are replacements. 25X1 South Africa The response among South African urban blacks to 25X1 Wednesday's goverment crackdown on the black consciousness movement is difficult to characterize, according to the US Consulate in Johannesburg, because virtually all urban black spokesmen in Soweto either have been arrested or are inaccessible. There has been no significant violent reaction thus 25X1 far; the mood in Soweto, however, appears to be one of confu-25X1 sion and repressed anger. The outlawing of most of the black political organizations snuffs out most legitimate avenues of black political 25X1 expression, and those seeking peaceful change must now go underground, paving the way for increased recruitment and activity by more radical groups. 25X1 Top Secret^d For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030400010016-6

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